Analysis: Vulcan Failure Reflects an Industry in Disarray

On November 15th 2026 at 12:40 PM, ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur rocket launched and later experienced a failure which resulted in the first payload loss in ULA’s history. A root cause has not been formally disclosed at this time. The failure resulted in a loss of all 40 Amazon Leo internet satellites aboard. The anomaly is a major blow to both ULA and the wider launch market; with the Atlas V and Falcon 9 rockets rapidly nearing their respective retirements, the industry is in desperate need of new reliable launch options to maintain space access for The United States.
Amazon has released a statement affirming ULA as a partner, the company stating, “We believe they’ll learn from this mission and deliver on their long-term plans for Vulcan.”

For Vulcan’s fifth launch, the major watch item was the performance of Vulcan-Centaur’s GEM 63XL solid rocket motors, which had experienced ascent failures on two previous launches, Cert-2, and USSF-87, wherein the nozzle of the booster burnt through and fell off mid-flight. On both of these flights, Vulcan’s core stage was able to correct for the under-performance and the missions continued to payload deployment. On this launch, Vulcan-Leo 1, the vehicle did not experience any SRB issues, but instead experienced what is apparently a completely new anomaly. In the CGI flight visualization shown by ULA, Vulcan appeared to separate its upper stage later than planned, placing its Centaur V upper stage into a spin from which the stage corrected and then pitched up dramatically. ULA confirmed over posts on X and its website that Centaur failed to make orbit and its payload was officially lost around 10 minutes post-launch. Vulcan is scheduled to launch over 30 future Leo missions for Amazon, and was already long delayed from its first launch for the company.

Vulcan is now 3 out of 5 for launch anomalies, and has now lost an operational payload. This latest failure comes off the heels of a major New Glenn anomaly on the launch pad at LC-36 this summer which resulted in the destruction of the facility. New Glenn’s failure has been tied to a flaw in the BE-4 main engine which New Glenn and Vulcan both utilise on their first stages. While the cause of the anomaly, whether it was the BE-4 engines on the core stage or Centaur V upper stage, has not been disclosed, either option carries immense implications for the readiness of vehicles beyond Vulcan. If BE-4 failed, then New Glenn and Blue Origin will find themselves under scrutiny; if Centaur V failed, then the recently announced Exploration Centaur designed to replace the ICPS stage on NASA’s SLS rocket may be affected as well. The industry is in a state of transition, with Falcon 9 and Dragon retiring right as Artemis is expected to begin routine flights to the Moon; who will hold what responsibilities in delivering the needs of government and industry alike is being determined in real time. Systems that can safely and routinely deliver large payloads and astronauts safely into diverse orbits are highly sought after, necessary capabilities. Vulcan was considered one of those systems, but repeated failures cast doubt over how soon it can truly be ready, and it’s not alone.

At this moment in time we are experiencing the symptoms of a widespread mismanagement of the space industry. Not only have Vulcan and New Glenn experienced repeated failures that have cost time, facilities, and payloads, but other companies have also experienced major technical hurdles with launch, ground and in-space systems. Starliner has experienced repeated technical failures across its orbital and crewed test flights, Neutron has experienced delays due to issues with composite production, Intuitive Machines experienced a near-identical repeat failure of its NOVA-C moon lander, and last year Starship experienced two near identical major anomalies on two launches just seven weeks apart. Even back in 2024, Falcon 9 experienced its own set of repeated upper stage failures. While the scale and specific nature of these anomalies varies, the rate at which anomalies seem to occur in all manner of space systems is a damning reflection of the quality assurance standards the increasingly unregulated space industry upholds.

Space operations in the United States across the board are operating at breakneck pace, and currently NASA is keen to change its roadmap in response to delays and technical hurdles. However, the response has not been to slow down and reassess the problems and needs of the space industry, the response has been accelerationism. When Exploration Upper Stage faced increasing delays, the solution was to replace it with a new stage and move the date forward two years from 2030 to 2028. When New Glenn experienced a massively destructive anomaly that impacted facilities across the entire Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, the solution was to rebuild (and redesign) the pad as quickly as possible and attempt to make a return to flight by the end of this year (which has predictably slipped into January).

Even the repeat issues of Vulcan and Starliner, met with very long drawn out investigations meant to be rigorous, have resulted in incorrect assessments that have sent flawed vehicles to the launch pad, even with astronauts in the loop. On some level Vulcan-Centaur’s failure proves that a slow and steady investigative process does not inherently mean a more watertight result, but it suggests that the root issues run deeper than just going faster. As failures become more widespread and threatening to the industry, the United States has pushed to deregulate the industry, under the guise of expediting competitiveness and ramp-up for launch providers old and new alike. At NASA, recent cancellations of multi-year old programs has resulted in experienced industry veterans leaving and carrying their technical experience with them, not to mention mass layoffs executed by DOGE beforehand seeking to cut costs across the entire government.
Leadership at NASA and in the federal government maintain the narrative that we are in a space race with China, and speed can not be sacrificed to address the problems facing the industry and Artemis because China has not slowed down. Systems like Vulcan-Centaur, poised to become a vital pillar of American crewed spaceflight, carry the weight of multiple government and commercial services on its back. These failures can reflect back on the work of not only ULA, but of industry giants such as Northrop Grumman and perhaps now Blue Origin. When failures with increasing impact are coming from the work of contractors new and old alike, it implies a broad issue that must be addressed head-on before this technical debt increases further or astronauts are once again the ones riding on a broken vehicle. The true reality of the United States aerospace sector, highlighted by the loss of Vulcan-Leo 1, is that we may be unready to meet the bold challenges demanded by civil and military space today.

The Exploration Centaur upper stage is currently expected to fly for the first time with four astronauts aboard it as an operational Artemis mission. Can we guarantee the safety of astronauts flying on a new stage while quality assurance problems across the industry are so widespread? That decision is being made now.
