Artemis Under Ignition
Jared Isaacman wasted little time in leaving his mark on NASA. As is continually reported by Space Scout, the administrator has enacted sweeping policies essentially overnight which have touched nearly every corner of the agency. Changes to the Artemis Program schedule and manifest were among the first changes Isaacman committed to public record. At a press conference ahead of Artemis II’s final roll to the pad, and again at a dedicated event, Jared Isaacman announced a new mission schedule for NASA’s Artemis Program, with the goal of increasing program flight rates under the White House’s Executive Order “Ensuring American Space Superiority” from December 2025. A later press event on March 24th titled “Ignition: NASA’s Plan For The Moon” elaborated further on the specific priority changes over the entire Artemis Program, including the cancellation of NASA’s Lunar Gateway.
The goal of this article is to attempt to extrapolate on the information we’ve been given so far to envision what the Artemis Program could look like under its new directives over the years to come. What does the agency seek to accomplish with Artemis, what is already in flow, and how does the program’s vision compare to its previous roadmap?
Artemis III
Following on from the highly publicized and successful Artemis II mission, Artemis III was previously both the final mission for the Space Launch System’s smaller Block 1 configuration, and the program’s first human landing mission. Broadly the mission could be thought of as testing three critical systems: Orion’s docking systems, the SpaceX Human Landing System, and the Axiom Space EVA Suits. However, delays to the SpaceX Human Landing System have long sparked doubts in the ability of the agency to execute such a mission, especially working to its original schedule which would’ve seen Artemis land on the Moon three years ago in 2024.
Under Isaacman Artemis III has changed even further, and is now scoped as a test mission in Earth Orbit. The stated outline of the mission involves docking Orion to prototype versions of both the Blue Origin and SpaceX HLS systems, with Blue Origin as the primary participant. Orion would first dock to the Blue Moon Mark 2 lander, with crew boarding to validate and give feedback on the vehicle’s flight control systems and cabin configuration. After departing Blue Moon, an “off the line” Starship Version 3 spacecraft will be launched into LEO, carrying a docking adapter, to which Orion will dock briefly prior to return to Earth. The level of involvement from the Axiom Space EVA in the mission profile remains somewhat uncertain, with the agency looking at suit test options aboard the ISS if they are not available for Artemis III. While preparing this article for publication, Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket, which would be responsible for delivering Blue Moon to space for Artemis III, experienced an on-pad detonation. The impacts to Artemis III’s schedule are unclear at this time, however the agency maintains confidence in a mid-2027 target date for all elements to be flight-ready.
This form of the mission would fly next year, with Isaacman maintaining a date of mid-2027 as the target date. Ideally, the flight reduces mission scope to one which is achievable in a shorter timeframe while still preserving the test flight contributions from the three necessary parties- Orion’s docking, the HLS vehicles, and the Axiom xEVA suits. NASA announced the crew for Artemis III June 9th, giving the crew just over a year of training ahead of the anticipated launch date. Furthermore, the mission now includes a bespoke configuration of the SLS launch vehicle, with the ICPS stage removed and replaced with a spacer module due to the lower energy requirements of the mission, and potentially preserving the ICPS for a future SLS vehicle if the Centaur V-based standardized config is not ready.
All this to say, the new schedule and mission for Artemis III comes with its own fair share of scheduling risk. Any delay to launch vehicle integration will delay the flight, as was the case with Artemis I and II before it, but there are now additional risks in the development and delivery of new, unique hardware which was not planned to exist just four months prior. Additionally, the readiness of SpaceX or Blue Origin in delivering vehicles, let alone matured HLS spacecraft with fully realized crew hardware, is dubious. It would not be a bold claim to predict Artemis III will fall behind schedule and its scope may continue to change. While Isaacman did state he “received responses from both vendors, both SpaceX and Blue Origin, to meet our needs for a late 2027 [mission],” the agency and Isaacman still maintain mid-2027 as the official target date as of June 9th. Despite all of this however, the Artemis III that flies was always going to fall short of NASA’s original vision of a 2024 landing, the question was a matter of how much.
Artemis IV and V
Looking to the future, Artemis IV was previously the second planned landing mission and first visit to the Lunar Gateway, with the crew delivering the European I-HAB module to the station. Artemis IV now resembles the original Artemis III: the final mission for the SLS Block 1 configuration, and the program’s first human landing mission. Artemis IV has been scheduled for 2028, alongside Artemis V, with both missions described as landing attempts, one for each HLS provider. Whichever system is ready first will be used on Artemis IV, and should the landing be aborted for any reason, Artemis V allows a second attempt in the same year with the other HLS provider. In the best case this schedule allows two landings, one with each HLS provider, if things go well.
This idealized vision for two full-scale lunar landings in the same calendar year brings to mind Apollo program timelines, and doubtlessly does so intentionally, as Isaacman has pressed hard for a routine annual cadence, deeming the program’s flight rate to-date as unsustainable. Uncrewed Artemis I launched Orion around the moon for the first time in 2022, but Artemis II took four years later to fly. This was in large part due to delays in the Orion spacecraft’s readiness. While vehicle-side delays were involved in Artemis II’s shifting schedule, the investigation added years onto the turnaround time. It is unlikely Artemis II could have flown as fast as its initial plan, but Artemis III hardware has already begun accumulating in the Vehicle Assembly Building to begin stacking operations this autumn. Core stage and engine hardware is already in work out to Artemis V.
This represents the operational flow that was already established prior to Isaacman taking administrative office, but the Admin’s primary concern for flight rate on the SLS-Orion side seemed to lie in the SLS Block 1B vehicle specifically, which was required for Artemis IV and beyond. Block 1B would have involved an extensive preflight test campaign for its new, larger Exploration Upper Stage, which had already seen development delays. While the tankage of EUS’ structural test article is completed, Isaacman and NASA leadership seem to be making a gamble on a different (but still new) configuration being ready faster. The “standardized Block 1” configuration keeps the SLS launch vehicle at approximately its current level of performance by swapping the ICPS for ULA’s Centaur V upper stage, which is already flying aboard the company’s new Vulcan-Centaur rocket. At this time all work has stopped on SLS Block 1B.
In a sense, replacing EUS with Centaur V replaces a problem with an equal and opposite problem. SLS Block 1B, while undelivered, does represent a finalized configuration with a fully understood flight profile, abort modes, structures, etc., and its design had been largely frozen for years—but it was not done being built. Standardized Block 1 uses a stage that is already built and flying, skipping the need for a green run and other preflight milestones EUS would still waiting on; however, integrating Centaur V with SLS’ core stage and avionics represents hardware and launch environments Centaur V was never built to interface with. Time will tell if Centaur V will truly end up faster than finishing EUS, but the maximum performance of the SLS vehicle will be drastically reduced. SLS Block 1B would’ve been one of the largest and most capable launch vehicles ever flown, carrying 130 tons to LEO (a performance figure that is a congressional requirement for SLS) and around 27 tons to NRHO, where the vehicle would’ve been tasked alongside Orion to assemble the Lunar Gateway.
In every conceivable way, Lunar Gateway is cancelled; the station is no longer planned to fly, some elements are being explicitly repurposed for new objectives, and the systems that aren’t are now under stop-work orders. In response to critique from various outlets and media figures, Isaacman disclosed over X, formerly Twitter, that Thales delivered corroded modules, suggesting the modules would see heavy delays or never reach flight readiness. Isaacman has repeatedly stated that Gateway was unnecessary and possibly counter to Artemis’ objectives of sustained presence at the Moon: “I think we, again, all universally agree it is better to have an astronaut on the surface than it is looking down from above it,” though it is unclear how Gateway would negatively impact the timeline of a lunar landing.
Isaacman has already proved politically and operationally that Artemis flights can be remanifested depending on objectives and the readiness of specific hardware elements. It is possible that cancelling Gateway was a move designed to loosen requirements for the SpaceX and Blue Origin Human Landing Systems. Gateway would require both HLS systems to be capable of active docking and travelling to and from NRHO, which added additional performance needs for vehicle hardware and software. Removing Gateway from the equation allows the active docking requirement to be offloaded to the existing Orion spacecraft, and opens up alternative orbits for staging sorties to and from the surface. It is not impossible to imagine the incremental model of HLS testing that Artemis III introduces being extended out to include gradually introducing these Gateway-specific requirements into the system.
Regardless, Artemis IV and V as a pair of flights share two primary objectives, land on the Moon, and introduce the Standardized Block 1 config. Without Gateway and EUS there is little room for any alternative mission profile: HLS is now the explicit pinnacle of the program, and as such the program’s entire future relies on either SpaceX or Blue Origin (optimally both) to deliver. Under the previous schedule, if HLS was unable to deliver a landing for Artemis IV, a Gateway-only mission was a conceivable alternative. Under Ignition, there is no alternative focus beyond HLS, and so Orion will return to the Moon only if HLS is there to meet it.
Ad Infinum?
Assuming the best case scenario, Artemis IV and V will demonstrate two parallel landing systems and a new SLS vehicle, which can both work to deliver an annual or even biannual cadence of missions to the lunar surface. Compared to the previous Artemis IV and V profiles, this is the scenario that was already intended, but now the flights are scheduled for 2028 instead of 2029 and 2030; the rocket is smaller, and there is no station – but astronauts are on the Moon sooner rather than later (at least, that’s the plan). So once astronauts are on the surface, where does Artemis go from here?
Isaacman reprioritized NASA’s objectives at the Moon into a large-scale presence on the lunar surface, named plainly “Moon Base.” Moon Base as a program seemingly encompasses all previously planned and future non-human lunar surface elements. In initial stages, Moon Base would begin its life as a new large round of Commercial Lunar Payload Services missions. The CLPS program has seen four robotic moon landers developed by private industry attempt landings on the Moon, with only one success so far. “CLPS 2.0,” featuring awards for developing larger landing systems, is expected to be unveiled properly later this year. NASA intends to order dozens more commercial landers over the next several years to deliver various, though largely indeterminate, payloads for Moon Base.
One such payload, the Lunar Terrain Vehicle, is a fleet of rovers capable of both being driven by astronauts or operated robotically. The Lunar Terrain Vehicle contract had been in work for several years, originally defined as large multi-role platforms that could work independently of or alongside human astronauts on the Moon. The original contract structure sought 15 years of operations on the surface of the Moon, with an award value as high as 1.9 billion dollars. However, on Ignition day NASA announced changes to the LTV program, loosely summarized as “smaller rovers delivered sooner,” platforms that were less ambitious in scope and could be deployed as soon as 2028 ahead of the Artemis IV landing. This led all three finalists to rapidly develop and propose entirely new designs, albeit informed by their original completed proposals, in order to remain competitive for the contract. The Lunar Terrain Vehicle contracts were finally awarded on May 26th to Astrolab and Lunar Outpost, with each provider given roughly 220 million dollars to deliver their rovers. NASA also awarded a separate contract to Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 1 lander to act as the standardized delivery vehicle for both rovers.
This pattern of taking existing assets and emphasizing them continues into other parts of Moon Base. Earlier this year Isaacman signed a memorandum of understanding with Italy for the delivery of a pressurized service habitat, the Multi-Purpose Habitat. This element is not new: it was already planned for delivery ahead of Artemis VI, and an award was given to Thales last summer to develop, build, and deliver the habitat. At the May 26th press conference, Isaacman announced the first three Moon Base missions would all launch to the Moon before the end of the year. However, all of these missions were previously contracted CLPS flights flying under a new designation: Blue Moon Pathfinder as Moon Base I, Griffin Mission 1 as Moon Base II, and Intuitive Machines-3 as Moon Base III. While not widely publicized prior to Isaacman, unpressurized and pressurized rovers, habitats, and CLPS were all part of the program already. Beyond a series of small independent spacecraft referred to as “Moonfall drones,” Moon Base as currently envisioned seems to introduce very little in terms of new capabilities or ideas; the strategy seems to largely involve taking assets already in flow and simply doing more of them sooner.
Beyond Artemis V, questions are raised about the future structure of the program. Artemis V is the furthest congressionally required SLS-Orion flight, and indications have already been made towards seeking out a commercial alternative as soon as Artemis VI to take over the responsibility of delivering astronauts to the Moon, with the goal of being cheaper and faster than the current system. Assuming that no such replacement arises for Artemis VI, SLS’ Standardized Block 1 would continue flying at an annual cadence, with the vehicle’s configuration remaining unchanged for some time. It has in fact been indicated that SLS, operating under a commercial format, is eligible for the contract. Isaacman has described Artemis as a program that can, should, and will continue to evolve over the years and decades to come as new capabilities come online and objectives change. This is certainly a reasonable position, a lot has changed over the past decades of spaceflight, and new options will certainly become available over time. All this to say however, NASA must exercise caution in its decision making process, and not just for the sake of institutional trust. NASA’s commercial partners have experienced major setbacks under the model of procurement already being used; it is unclear they are ready to accelerate aggressively now, let alone take on increased responsibility by the time of Artemis VI.
Moon to Mars?
There has been notably little regarding how Moon Base plays into human exploration plans for Mars. Previously, surface activities for Artemis were designed to act as a testing ground for new technologies, such as nuclear surface power, which would be relevant to a Mars mission. Under the new paradigm, however, Moon Base is not just a testing ground but a major central goal. When returning astronauts to the Moon’s surface became the explicit primary objective of Artemis, Gateway was scrapped in favor of it. Though NASA organizes annual conferences regarding Mars mission architecture requirements, NASA’s Mars plans are far more nebulous than Gateway was. It is not difficult to imagine Mars being pushed aside as Moon Base becomes the singular focus of Artemis; in fact, the many-billion dollar roadmap laid out for Moon Base on Ignition Day provides a lot of that imagination for us.
The major element Ignition dedicates to Mars lies not in Moon Base but its “SR-1 Freedom” spacecraft, a nuclear fission reactor attached to the electric propulsion element of Gateway to act as a demonstration mission for nuclear-electric spacecraft, which is planned to launch in 2028. At this time, the Power and Propulsion Element of Gateway being used for SR-1 is the only Gateway module being repurposed for a new objective. Gateway as-planned was already a demonstration of a solar-electric spacecraft, and one that would have human systems integrated to allow for long-duration human activities in deep space. SR-1 forgoes human systems (and human accessibility) in favor of delivering a small Mars mission: Skyfall, which would involve three independently operating spacecraft based off the Mars2020 mission’s Ingenuity helicopter. The payload is minuscule (especially compared to what was previously NASA’s next Mars mission: Mars Sample Return), but is ultimately a secondary objective. What SR-1 seeks to demonstrate that Gateway would not is the range and duration of a nuclear-electric system in interplanetary space, with the vehicle potentially moving to additional targets beyond Mars after delivering Skyfall.
Effectively, SR-1 replaces Gateway, and in some ways it is a move comparable to replacing EUS with Centaur V. Gateway was a known design experiencing setbacks, such as modules which need repair, while SR-1 is a new almost certainly unfinalized design that needs to procure new elements (Skyfall, and the nuclear power module). SR-1 provides new demonstrations for Mars spacecraft that Gateway would not, yet also drops demonstrations that Gateway would have provided. Time will tell if SR-1 will be delivered faster than Gateway was planned, but regardless, even assuming a launch on-time, it is difficult to confidently say the program is better for it.
Now What?
Artemis, both near and long term, has shifted its roadmap significantly, however the new plans cannot escape old challenges: the pressure remains for SpaceX and Blue Origin to deliver and demonstrate safe, reliable systems to delivering astronauts to the Moon, and both must now attempt to provide prototypes for Artemis III along the way. Gateway and SLS Block 1B have been cast aside, freeing up the program’s requirements in some ways while restricting its options in others. While Moon Base consolidates and prioritizes the existing surface elements of the Artemis Program, the timelines are as ambitious as they are new, and while controversial, implementing the new policies politically has seen little resistance from Congress. It remains to be seen how Ignition holds when it inevitably faces its first setbacks.
Ignition does not inherently mean NASA has lost the Moon. The elements that worked leading to Artemis II remain, and in many ways the roadmap to the Moon are not affected by policy changes alone. What NASA has lost is continuity. Continuity of objectives, guided by congressional oversight, between presidential terms has been the primary factor allowing Artemis to survive to its first flight – a feat never meaningfully accomplished by the programs which existed in the intervening years. It is difficult to say so early on if Artemis has truly changed for the better; for now, Artemis is merely different, but if NASA chooses to embrace these changes then it must work to reestablish continuity and trust. The rapid, unresisted changes made to the Artemis Program, regardless of impact, sets precedent for future leadership to impose their own vision for NASA’s exploration programs. Just as the delays of previous years justified the changes being made now, without care the delays yet to come could justify yet another shift in focus: that’s a cycle NASA tried before, and it did not work.
